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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2-2; and Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED 
The following questions are presented to this Court by Order of 
Certification of U.S. District Judge Tena Campbell, a copy of which is included as 
Exhibit "A55 in the Addendum: 
1. Whether the termination of an employee in retaliation for the 
exercise of rights under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 34A-2-101, et. seq., ("WCA") implicates "a clear and 
substantial public policy" of the State of Utah? 
2. If so, whether this cause of action applies in the following 
circumstances: (a) where the employee is not injured but is retaliated 
against for opposing an employer's treatment of other injured 
employees; (b) the employee is not fired but resigns under 
circumstances that constitute "constructive discharge;" and (c) the 
employee is neither fired nor constructively discharged, but 
experiences other discriminatory treatment or harassment from an 
employer in retaliation for exercise of rights under the WCA? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The questions certified by the United States District Court are questions of 
state law. "On certification, we 'answer the legal questions presented' without 'resolving 
the underlying dispute.'" In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71,16, 99 P.3d 793, 794, quoting 
Spackman ex rel Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc, 2000 UT 87, PI n.2, 16 P.3d 533. 
IV. STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW 
Utah R. App. Proc. 41 authorizes the Court to answer a question of law 
certified to it by a court of the United States. The Order of Certification by the U.S. 
4090/2 00068588v 2 1 
District Court for the District of Utah was filed on April 14, 2005. This Court accepted 
review in its Order of Acceptance dated May 19, 2005. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Eight former employees of La-Z-Boy Incorporated ("La-Z-Boy" or 
"Defendant") brought an action based on how it allegedly treated employees who suffer 
on-the-job injuries.1 Plaintiffs' Complaint asserted three causes of action under Utah 
common law: wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception to the at-will rule 
of employment, intentional failure to maintain a safe workplace, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. La-Z-Boy subsequently filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings and a Motion to Certify Questions of Law. 
Following a hearing, the federal court dismissed the second and third 
causes of action, finding that both were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-105(1) ("WCA"). The 
court also found that the third cause of action failed to allege "outrageous conduct" under 
Utah law. With respect to the first cause of action, alleging retaliation for seeking 
benefits under the WCA, the court granted the Motion to Certify and reserved ruling on 
this portion of Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pending this Court's 
response to the Order of Certification. 
1
 The matter was originally filed in the First Judicial District Court of Box 
Elder County, State of Utah, on April 12, 2004. It was subsequently removed to the U.S. 
District Court based on diversity of citizenship. 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has listed f< »ur categories nf° discharge "eligible 
for consideratk \ • exception to the employment at-will rule: (1) 
refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) performing a public duty; (3) exercising a legal 
right; or (4) reporting an employee's criminal activity to a public authority. Hansen v. 
America Online, Inc., 200 I 1II «>25 \ 9, 96 >o0, yo^ ] ^ discharge must contravene 
"a clear iiul substantial public policy," such as a right that is "essential to our way of life, 
the architecture of the institutions of government, or the distribution of government 
power." Id at f^ 12. 
Although the t \mrt has referred to discharge for seeking workers' 
compensation benefits as an example from other states of the third category, which would 
be eligible for consideration, it has never confronted tho question 1 he <>nly cases in 
which it has actually mse of action lo apply involve employees fired for 
refusing to commit crimes, Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992), or for 
opposing an employer's criminal activity, Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 
1992). 
The Utah Supreme Court's decisions since Peterson and Heslop evince a 
strong reluctance to create or extend causes of action to terminated employees in the 
absence of legislative direction t\ ^  \\\\\ t mixl: specificali) i loted in Hansen, exceptions to 
empl< >ymnit n-wili "should be applied parsimoniously" and the third category "poses 
analytical challenges different from, and generally greater than the others" even when the 
statutory right or privilege "carries strong public policy credentials " Id at 952-53. 
4090/2 00068588v 2 3 
Recent decisions, including Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 99 P.3d 842, and Gottling 
v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, 61 P.3d 989, show the Court's reluctance to add causes of 
action to legislative schemes when the Utah Legislature could have done so but did not. 
A survey of the laws in all 50 states reveals that courts in 25 states 
recognized a cause of action only after their legislature had enacted an anti-retaliation or 
interference statute, courts in 11 states refused to create a workers' compensation 
retaliation cause of action without a specific legislative enactment, courts in three states 
have no court holdings or statute addressing the issue, and courts in 11 states have 
judicially created a tort based on the "general policies" in their workers' compensation 
statutes. The methodology used by the minority of courts that judicially created a tort 
does not comport with this Court's requirement that an exception to the at-will rule must 
be based on a specific statement of a "clear and substantial" policy, not a general 
statement of policy. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998). 
Even if the public policy wrongful discharge claim were applied to 
terminations for seeking WCA benefits, it should not be extended to claims of internal 
opposition to an employer's workers' compensation practice, constructive discharge, or 
other discriminatory or harassing conduct. Such an extension would constitute an even 
greater incursion on the Legislature's prerogatives. Even jurisdictions that have 
recognized a retaliatory discharge tort have drawn the line there, and refused to expand 
the common law exception as Plaintiffs advocate. 
4090/2 00068588v 2 4 
\ II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE PUBLIC POLICY WRONGFUL DISCHARGE EXCEPTION 
TO THE AT-WILL RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION RETALIATION. 
1. Utah's Workers' Compensation Act Constitutes A 
Comprehensive Statutory Scheme That Neither Expresses Nor 
Implies Any Intent To Create A Wrongful Discharge Cause Of 
Action Based On The Filing Of A Workers' Compensation 
Claim. 
Utah enacted the "Workmen's Compensation Act" ("WCA") in 1917. 
Chapter 100, Sess. Laws Utah 1917. By that time, the at-will doctrine had been well-
established. C.S. Price v. Western Loan and Savings Co., 35 I Jtah 3 79, 387, 100 P 6 77 
(1909) i u |)I io M i I 11\ (ii e \ i(-»i 11 doctrine and citing authorities).2 Nevertheless, when the 
2
 In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd, 111 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989), the 
Court indicated that "[t]he genesis of the at-will rule in its present form in America, 
however, can be traced to Horace G. Wood's 1877 treatise on the master-servant 
relationship." Recent scholarship on at-will employment indicates that the doctrine 
became the default rule for employment contracts in this country because of a severe 
labor shortage in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries. See 
Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule Revisited: A 
Challenge to Its Origins as Based in the Development of Advanced Capitalism, 13 
Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 75 (1995) (observing that employment at-will was prevalent 
throughout the nineteenth century); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful 
Provenance ofi( Wood's Rule " Revisited, 22 Ariz. St. L.J. 351 (1990) (noting that Wood's 
statement of the employee at-will rule was based on a well-established understanding of 
labor relations). This scholarship calls into question the view that employment at-will 
was created at the end of the nineteenth century to benefit employers. Andrew P. Morriss, 
Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment 
At-Will, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 679 (1994) (disputing earlier scholarship on the employment at-
will rule that had previously formed the basis for courts and commentators to advocate 
modification to the rule). "Laborers who could easily obtain free land wanted to work 
only long enough to accumulate enough capital to start their own farms and thus did not 
want to be bound to a long-term employment relationship." Ballam, The Development of 
the Employment At Will Rule Revisited, 13 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. I J. at 88 n.86. 
4090/2 00068588v 2 5 
Legislature enacted the WCA, it did not create a right to sue for wrongful discharge in 
retaliation for exercising one's rights under the WCA. The Utah Labor Commission, 
which is responsible for administering the Workers' Compensation Act, has plainly stated 
that 'there is nothing in the Utah Workers* Compensation Act that prohibits an employer 
from terminating an employee."3 A review of the WCA shows that the Legislature has 
amended it over a dozen times since 1917, but it has not created a cause of action for 
retaliatory discharge. There is simply no language in the WCA from which any such 
right could be implied. 
Before recognizing such a wrongful discharge cause of action, this Court 
should, like the majority of courts, require a "clear and substantial" statement of policy in 
the form of an anti-retaliation statute, rather than tease an inference of such policy out of 
a comprehensive scheme of legislation that contains no anti-retaliation language 
whatsoever. See Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1282 (the public policy exception applies only 
3Utah Labor Commission Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http:/www.laborcomission.utah.gov/FAQ.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2005). 
RE-EMPLOYMENT - REHABILITATION 
Q 27. CAN MY EMPLOYER FIRE ME IF I CANT RETURN TO 
MY JOB DUE TO THE INJURY? 
A. It is considered poor judgment for an employer to terminate any 
employee without considering the possible consequences of such action. 
However, there is nothing in the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act that 
prohibits an employer from terminating an employee. If the employer has 
15 or more employees, the injured worker may want to look into the 
Americans With Disabilities Act and other employment laws. 
4090/2 00068588v 2 6 
"when the statutory language expressing the public conscience is clear and when the 
affected interests of society are substantial"). 
Although one could speculate about whether the absence of such a cause of 
action might frustrate the policy of ensuring benefits to employees who sustain on-the-job 
injuries, Utah's own experience has debunked such speculation. Employees in Utah have 
been collecting workers' compensation benefits for over 78 years, yet there is no 
evidence that the absence of a retaliatory discharge tort has undermined the policies 
underlying the WCA. 
If a court were to evaluate the need for such a tort, it would have to 
consider whether there is a need for an anti-retaliation law in light of the self-regulating 
nature of negative publicity and employee morale for engaging in such conduct, and 
whether any public benefit to be gained from creating such a cause of action would be 
outweighed by the harm that results from creating new uncertainties in the at-will 
employment relationship, weeding out meritless claims, and abrogating the freedom of 
contract. One would have to speculate about its impact without obtaining any data or 
input from the affected constituents, including what impact it would have on Utah's 
employers (large and small), its economy, and its judicial resources. Emory v. Nanticoke 
Homes, Inc., 1985 Del. Super. LEXIS 1063 (1985) (some of the legislative considerations 
that would be involved in creating such a tort would include whether damages should be 
limited, whether the remedy should include reinstatement as well as reimbursement, 
whether the remedy should be administrative in nature, whether the remedy should be 
4090/2 00068588 v 2 7 
available to the employee who is refused a job as well as an existing employee, and what 
statute of limitations should apply.) 
As the court in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 
461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (1983) observed: 
The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to 
discern the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, 
to elicit the views of the various segments of the community that would be 
directly affected and in any event critically interested, and to investigate 
and anticipate the impact of imposition of such liability. Standards should 
doubtless be established applicable to the multifarious types of employment 
and the various circumstances of discharge. If the rule of non-liability for 
termination of at-will employment is to be tempered, it should be 
accomplished through a principled statutory scheme, adopted after 
opportunity for public ventilation, rather than in consequence of judicial 
resolution of the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants. 
Additionally, if the rights and obligations under a rekitionship forged, 
perhaps some time ago, between employer and employee in reliance on 
existing legal principles are to be significantly altered, a fitting 
accommodation of the competing interests to be affected may well dictate 
that any change should be given prospective effect only, or at least so the 
Legislature might conclude, [citations omitted] 
The Utah Legislature has not been reluctant to enact legislation to protect 
employees from retaliation or interference with employee statutory rights when it 
discerns a need to do so. For example, the Legislature enacted statutes to protect 
employees from retaliation or interference with employee rights under the Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-6-203, retaliation for 
asserting rights under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ("UADA"), UTAH CODE ANN. § 
34A-5-106, and retaliation for the exercise of rights under the Utah Payment of Wages 
Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-19. The Legislature, however, has so far chosen not to 
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create such a cause of action for retaliation or interference with rights granted by the 
WCA. See Emory, supra, (it is "significant that no discharge provision is included in the 
comprehensive Workmen's Compensation Act when the General Assembly has 
precluded discharge in other contexts"). Whatever the reasons for this inaction, it cannot 
be said, as in some jurisdictions, that legislative silence is in recognition of an existing 
court-created cause of action, since this has not happened. Given the Legislature's role as 
"the primary institutional source of public policy" in Utah, Hansen, 2004 UT at ^ f 24, this 
Court should not impose its policy choices onto a scheme of legislation where the 
Legislature itself has chosen not to act. 
2. The Vast Majority Of Jurisdictions That Have Recognized A 
Claim Of Wrongful Discharge Based On The Filing Of A 
Workers' Compensation Claim Have Relied On Their 
Legislatures, Not their Courts, to Enact An Anti-Retaliation or 
Interference Statute Before Recognizing Such A Cause of 
Action. 
a. Overview Of The Status of Workers' Compensation 
Retaliation Law In 50 States. 
In the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Plaintiffs argued that 
because the majority of states have created such a cause of action either by statute or as a 
matter of common law, Utah should not remain behind as one of the unenlightened few. 
An analysis of the laws of other states, however, reveals that Utah would be in the 
majority of jurisdictions where, if the cause of action came about, it would be because the 
4090/2 00068588v 2 9 
legislature had expressly created it or prohibited retaliation or interference with workers' 
compensation rights and courts then recognized a cause of action.4 
Most states, like Utah, have had workers' compensation laws on the books 
since the early part of the 20 century. Most did not include any anti-retaliation 
provisions in their original statutory scheme. Unlike Utah, however, many state 
Legislatures have since added anti-retaliation provisions to their workers' compensation 
statutes. Most of this legislation has occurred in the last few decades. See, e.g., Raley v. 
Darling Shop, 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950) (there is no wrongful discharge tort 
based on the filing of a workers' compensation claim), superseded by statute, S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 41-1-80 (1986) (uNo employer may discharge or demote any employee because 
the employee has instituted or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under 
the South Carolina Worker's Compensation Law "), as recognized in Hines v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 675, 677 (D.S.C. 1990). 
The statutes, procedures, rights, and remedies vary widely from state to 
state. This diversity reflects not only the fact that states have diverse policies, but also 
the fact that this patchwork quilt of enactments is based on legislative policy-making, not 
4
 Attached in the Addendum are three Exhibits that provide a survey of the 
status of workers' compensation retaliation laws in 50 states. Exhibit B identifies those 
jurisdictions in which courts did not recognize a cause of action at all, or did so only after 
their legislatures had enacted an anti-retaliation or interference statute. Exhibit C 
identifies those jurisdictions in which courts judicially created a tort based on the general 
policies in the workers' compensation statute. Exhibit D identifies those jurisdictions in 
which courts have not determined whether a cause of action exists and the legislature has 
not enacted an anti-retaliation or interference statute. 
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"common law." This diversity is further underscored by the fact that some legislatures 
have refused to enact any anti-retaliation or interference legislation at all. 
Most courts did not begin to recognize a cause of action for retaliatory 
discharge until their state legislatures added an anti-retaliation or interference provision 
to their workers' compensation law. Indeed, the vast majority of jurisdictions that have 
created a wrongful discharge cause of action to protect the exercise workers5 
compensation rights have relied on their state legislatures to provide the basis for creating 
the cause of action. Currently, the breakdown is as follows: 
In 25 states, the legislature filled the silence by enacting an anti-retaliation 
or interference statute in derogation of the at-will rule.5 
In 11 states, courts expressly refused to create a retaliatory discharge tort in 
the absence of an express directive from the legislature. 
In 5 of those 11 states, courts refused to create a cause of action, and 
the legislature has continued not to enact an anti-retaliation or 
interference statute.6 
In 6 of those 11 states, courts refused to create a cause of action, but 
the legislature responded by enacting an anti-retaliation or 
interference statute.7 
In 11 other states, courts created a cause of action based on the general 
policies in the workers' compensation statute, despite the absence of a 
specific anti-retaliation or interference statute.8 
* Exhibit B(3). 
«Exhibit B(l). 
7 Exhibit B(2). 
8
 Exhibit C. 
4090/2 00068588v 2 11 
In 3 states, courts have not determined whether a cause of action exists and 
the legislature has not enacted an anti-retaliation or interference statute.9 
Thus, of the 42 jurisdictions that have created a retaliatory discharge cause 
of action, 31 did not recognize a cause of action until after their legislatures had taken 
action. Only 11 courts have done what Plaintiffs are asking this Court to do, i.e., create 
such a cause of action in the absence of legislative action, while 11 other courts have 
expressly refused to do what Plaintiffs are asking this Court to do. 
Following the judicial refusal to create a retaliatory discharge tort, 
legislatures in six states have enacted anti-retaliation statutes. See, e.g., Dockery v. 
Lampart Table Company and U.S. Furniture Industries, 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 
272 (1978) (refusing to create a retaliatory discharge tort), superseded byN.C. GEN. STAT 
§ 95-24. Some have not. See, e.g., Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1993) 
(refusing to create a cause of action for wrongful discharge without legislative action; 
since then, the Rhode Island legislature has not created a retaliatory discharge cause of 
action for filing a workers' compensation claim). In those states where the legislatures 
did create a cause of action, some created broad remedies. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS. 
ch. 152 § 75B (providing for reemployment, lost wages, attorney's fees and equitable 
relief). Some created limited remedies. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-80 (limits 
remedy to reinstatement and lost wages). Some relied on an administrative process to 
resolve claims. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A § 353 (providing only an 
9 Exhibit D. 
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administrative remedy). Some allowed claimants to seek remedies in the courts. See, 
e.g., CONN. GEN STAT. § 31-290a) (allows claimant to "[b]ring a civil action in the 
superior court" or "to file a complaint with the chairman of the Workers' Compensation 
Commission"). Such diversity in the statutes shows that the creation of a workers' 
compensation retaliation constitutes policy-making that is best suited for the legislatures, 
not the courts. 
b. In 25 States, Courts Recognized A Cause Of Action Only 
After The Legislature Had Enacted An Anti-Retaliation 
Or Interference Statute. 
Legislatures in 25 jurisdictions have enacted statutory restrictions on 
workers' compensation retaliation without a prior judicial holding on the issue of whether 
a retaliatory discharge cause of action exists. Some of those legislatures have given their 
courts a more specific statement of policy than others, cf. CONN. GEN STAT. § 3 l-290a 
("No employer . . . shall discharge . . . any employee because the employee has filed a 
claim for worker's compensation benefits") with IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15) ("No 
. . . device shall . . . relieve any employer . . . of any obligation created by this act."). 
In cases like Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E. 
2d 425 (1973), and its progeny, however, courts have emphasized the importance of 
relying on specific statutory language, rather than on general policies in the workers' 
compensation statutes, to recognize the existence of a cause of action. In Frampton, the 
court held that a retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim was 
actionable, because it violated IND. ANN. STAT § 40-1215, which states: 
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No contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation or other 
device shall, in any manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in 
part of any obligation created by this act. (court's emphasis) 
The court interpreted "the threat of discharge to be a 'device' within the framework of [the 
statute] and hence, in clear contravention of public policy." 260 Ind. at 252, 297 N.E.2d 
at 427-28. *° 
In 1984, the Indiana Court of Appeals acknowledged the statutory 
underpinnings of Frampton: 
Although the court in Frampton spoke in terms of public policy, it did so in 
the sense of enforcing a specific statutory prohibition against the use of any 
'device' to relieve an employer of its obligation under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. An attempt to declare any discharge unlawful where the 
reason for discharge is contrary to general public policy was specifically 
rejected [by other cases]. Such a broad exception was left for legislative 
expression of what constitutes public policy or which of competing public 
policies should be given preference. 
Rice v. Grant County Ed. ofComm'rs, Ml N.E.2d 213, 215 (Ind. App.2d Dist. 1984) 
(emphasis added).11 The only other wrongful discharge tort that Indiana courts have 
10
 Five other jurisdictions (Iowa, North Carolian,South Dakota, Tennessee, 
and Wyoming) with similar "other device" language in their workers' compensation 
statute. Four of those states have followed Frampton, but one has not. Cf. Springer v. 
Weeks and Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988) ("We deem this ['other device' 
provision] to be a clear expression that it is the public policy of this state that an 
employee's right to seek the compensation which is granted by law for work-related 
injuries should not be interfered with"); with Dockery v. Lampert Table Co., 36 N.C. 
App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (N.C. App. 1978) ("We think complex problems such as 
'devices' to defeat provisions of an act of the Legislature, are best left to the expertise and 
resources of that body"). 
11
 "With such a specific statutory base the [1973 Frampton]decision did not 
have the appearance of a broad attack on the employment-at-will doctrine." Cornelius J. 
Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding The Development Of The Law 
Of Wrongful Discharge, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 719, 724 (1991). 
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recognized is based on retaliation for refusing to violate the law. Wior v. Anchor 
Industries, Inc> 669 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. 1996) ("we are disinclined to adopt generalized 
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine in the absence of a clear statutory 
expression of a right or duty that is contravened")- Thus, Utah and Indiana are similar, 
except that one legislature enacted "other device" language and the other did not. 
c. In 11 States, Courts Refused To Create A Retaliatory 
Discharge Tort In The Absence Of An Express Directive 
From The Legislature. 
Although 25 of the 32 legislatures that have enacted workers' compensation 
retaliation statutes did so in the face of judicial silence, legislatures in six states acted 
only after their courts had refused to create a retaliatory discharge tort.12 The experience 
of these states illustrates how the separation of powers between the legislative and 
judicial branches is supposed to work. 
The first state to address the issue specifically was Missouri. In Christy v. 
Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956), the Missouri Supreme Court rejected 
plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim, because it could "hardly conceive of the Legislature 
making such careful provision for the rights and compensation of injured employees 
covered by the Act and yet omitting a specific provision for recovery of damages for 
wrongful discharge if there had been any intent to create such a right." 365 Mo. at 1193; 
295 S.W. 2d at 126. In 1973, however, the Missouri Legislature enacted Mo. ANN STAT 
§ 287.78, which authorizes a "civil action for damages." 
12
 Exhibit B(2). 
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In Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814, 815 (Ala. 1984), the 
Alabama Supreme Court, in refusing to allow an employee to sue his former employer 
for dismissing him because he had filed a workers compensation claim, observed: "Why 
then should we not leave it to the Legislature to change the rule in this case, where the 
employee was discharged allegedly for seeking workmen's compensation benefits, a 
legislatively created right?" Since then, the Alabama Legislature enacted ALA. CODE § 
25-5-11.1, which states: "No employee shall be terminated by an employer solely 
because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to 
recover worker's compensation benefits " Twilley v. Dauber & Coated Prods., Inc., 
536 So. 2d 1364 (Ala. 1988). 
In Dockery v. Lampert Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (Ct. 
App.), cert denied, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978), the court refused to recognize a tort of 
wrongful discharge based on the filing of a workers' compensation claim. It observed: 
"If the General Assembly of North Carolina had intended a cause of action be created, 
surely, in a workmen's compensation statute as comprehensive as ours, it would have 
specifically addressed the problem." 36 N.C. at 297. 
To attempt to redress this balance by judicial action without legislative 
authority appears to us a doubtful policy... We believe the General 
Assembly is well equipped to weigh the various social and economic 
factors presented by the plaintiffs allegations in this case and to take 
appropriate action promoting the public welfare. 
Since then, the General Assembly enacted N.C. GEN. STAT § 97-6.1, which provides that 
"No employer may discharge or demote any employee because the employee has 
instituted or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the North 
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Carolina Worker's Compensation A c t . . . . " Wright v. Fiber Indus,, Inc., 60 N.C. App. 
486, 299 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. App. 1983), 
Legislatures in five states have declined to create a cause of action even 
after their courts had refused to create one judicially.13 In Emory v. Nanticoke Homes, 
Inc., 1985 Del. Super. LEXIS 1063 (1985), the Delaware Supreme Court refused to 
create a retaliatory discharge tort based on the filing of a workers' compensation claim. 
The court observed: 
Unlike a growing number of other jurisdictions, the Delaware Legislature 
has not seen fit to provide a statutory remedy for a claim of retaliatory 
discharge arising form a worker's compensation claim. Creation of a new 
cause of action in this complicated area raises a number of policy issues 
which require legislative consideration. While the time may be ripe for 
some limitation on an employer's right to discharge, the proper balance 
between the right to contract for employment and rights under the 
worker's compensation statute should be struck by the Legislature. 
(emphasis added) 
To date, the Delaware Legislature has struck that balance against the creation of such a 
retaliatory discharge tort. 
In Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1993), the Supreme Court 
of Rhode Island held that "there is no cause of action for wrongful discharge," observing 
that "it is not the role of the courts to create rights for persons whom the Legislature has 
chosen not to protect." To date, the Rhode Island General Assembly has not created a 
retaliatory discharge cause of action for employees who seek to recover workers' 
compensation benefits. 
u Exhibit B(l). 
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In Evans v. Bibb Co., 178 Ga. App. 139, 342 S.E. 2d 484 (Ga. App. 1986), 
the plaintiff argued that his employer had wrongfully discharged him for exercising his 
rights under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act. The court held that "in the 
absence of any express statutory provision for such a civil remedy in the Act, we decline 
appellant's invitation to create judicially such a remedy. 'Courts may interpret laws, but 
may not change them.'" 178 Ga. App. at 139-40 (citation omitted). Since then, the 
Georgia Legislature has elected not to add an anti-retaliation provision to its workers' 
compensation statute. 
As the foregoing case law demonstrates, numerous courts have resisted the 
temptation to impose a retaliatory discharge tort onto a statutory scheme that has been 
carefully crafted and refined by their legislatures for decades. Furthermore, these cases 
demonstrate that when courts rely on the legislature to define the public policy of the 
state, particularly in the context of a complex scheme of legislation like the workers' 
compensation statute, it allows legislators to carve the public policy with a scalpel, rather 
than a blunt instrument. 
d. In 11 States, Courts Created A Tort Based On The 
General Policies In The Workers' Compensation Statute, 
Despite The Absence Of A Specific Anti-Retaliation Or 
Interference Statute. 
Some jurisdictions have created a workers' compensation retaliatory 
discharge cause of action in the absence of any specific statutory prohibition,14 but they 
14
 Exhibit C. 
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generally do not explain why the court, rather than the legislature, should make the 
necessary policy choices to create such a tort, define its parameters, and determine the 
appropriate remedies. In Jackson v. Morris Communications Corp., 265 Neb. 423, 657 
N.W. 2d 634, 640 (2003), for example, the court created a retaliatory discharge tort based 
on "the general purpose and unique nature of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act 
itself provides a mandate for public policy." 
Not surprisingly, dissenting judges in some of these cases have criticized 
the majority for invading the province of the legislature. For example, one judge 
observed, "The majority has in effect engaged injudicial legislation. . . . Under the guise 
of 'public policy' they have gone beyond judicial interpretation to create a new cause of 
action without express legislative authority." Svento v. The Kroger Company, 69 Mich. 
App. 644; 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) (Danhof, C. J.) (dissenting from the court's 2-1 
decision that created a retaliatory discharge tort based on the general policy of the 
worker's compensation statute), superseded by statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301(11). 
as recognized in Wilson v. Acacia Park Cemetery Assoc, 162 Mich. App. 638, 413 
N.W.2d 79 (1987) (refusing to create by "judicial fiat" a retaliatory discharge tort 
premised upon the employer's anticipation of a future claim, because the "workers' 
compensation law is particularly within the province of the Legislature, which has chosen 
to occupy this field by its enactment of a comprehensive statutory scheme"). 
Although legislatures in some states, like Michigan, have superseded such 
judicially created torts with statutes, such action indicates that courts should not invade 
the province of the legislature in the first place. Indeed, some legislatures have rebuked 
4090/2 00068588 v 2 1 9 
their own courts for doing so. For example, although the Arizona Supreme Court held in 
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985), that 
an at-will employee could bring a wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the 
Arizona legislature rebuked the court for usurping its function. Galati v. America West 
Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290; 69 P.3d 1011 (2003) ("The legislature in enacting A.R.S. § 
23-1501 took express exception to the court's indication that it rather than the legislature 
had the authority to define public policy"). 
In Wal-Mart v. Pam Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239; 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991), the 
Arkansas Supreme Court created a wrongful discharge tort based on a criminal statute. 
The Arkansas legislature, however, specifically overruled Wal-Mart and two other cases 
by name in the text of the statute itself. "There is no doubt that the legislature's intent in 
the passage of Act 796 of 1993 [amending Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107, which prohibits 
workers' compensation discrimination and provides for a limited remedy], in fact its 
avowed purpose, was to overrule our decisions [in three cases, including Wal-Mart], 
where we" created retaliatory discharge tort based on the criminal statute. Tackett v. 
Crain Automotive d/b/a Car Pro, 321 Ark. 36, 38; 899 S.W.2d 839, 840 (1995) (J. Corbin 
dissenting opinion). Thus, even in some jurisdictions where courts have created a cause 
of action, judges and legislatures alike have expressed reservations about such incursions 
on the legislative function. 
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3. Utah's Conservative Approach And Deference To The 
Legislature Does Not Comport With Those Courts That Have 
Relied On The General Purpose Of Their Workers' 
Compensation Statutes To Create A Retaliatory Discharge Tort. 
Utah has assigned the primary policy making function to the Legislature, 
not the courts. Utah Const. Art. V., § l.15 The Constitution directs the Supreme Court to 
"report in writing to the Governor any seeming defect or omission in the law/5 Utah 
Const. Art. VIII., § 22, not to correct it. This Court has recognized not only that the 
Legislature is "the primary institutional source of public policy," Hansen, 2004 UT at 
T[ 24, but also that courts cannot rely on general policies in legislation, as opposed to a 
clear manifestation of policy in a specific statute, as a basis to create torts or to expand on 
the legislature's work. See Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998) 
("a general public policy against the manufacturer, importation and distribution of drugs 
. . . is not the type of clear and substantial policy that will support Ryan's wrongful 
discharge claim"); Shaw v. Railroad Co.
 % 101 U.S. 557 (1879) ("No statute is to be 
construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import. It is not to be 
construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly 
express"). 
15
 "The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall 
exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly 
directed or permitted." See also Utah Const. Art. VI., § 1 ("The Legislative Power shall 
be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which shall be designated The 
Legislature of the State of Utah"). 
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Although this Court has referred to workers5 compensation retaliation as an 
example of an exception to the at-will rule that other states have recognized, it has never 
confronted the issue. In both Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998), 
and Hansen v. America Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, 96 P.3d 950, 952, the Court referred to 
workers5 compensation retaliation as an example of what has been done in other 
jurisdictions under the third category of the public policy wrongful discharge claim-
discharge for exercising legal rights or privileges—but it has never indicated that this 
example reflects the current state of Utah law, much less held that the cause of action 
exists. 
On the contrary, in Dan's Foods, the Court stated that although "an 
employee's refusing to violate the law," would "almost always implicate a clear and 
substantial public policy;55 all "other situations,55 however, have to be addressed "as they 
come before us.55 Id. at 408. It emphasized that a public policy would only be deemed 
clear "if plainly defined by legislative enactments,55 Id. at 405, and rejected plaintiffs 
claim that the statute reflected a broader public policy against distribution of unlawful 
drugs, stating: "[T]his general policy is not the type of clear and substantial policy that 
will support Ryan's wrongful discharge claim.55 Id. at 407. 
In Hansen, the Court refused to create a cause of action for employees 
claiming to have been fired in retaliation for exercising rights under Utah law to bear 
firearms. It noted the four categories of wrongful discharge "eligible for consideration55 
under the public policy exception to the at-will rule: (1) refusing to commit an illegal act; 
(2) performing a public obligation; (3) exercising a legal right "such as filing a workers5 
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compensation claim;" or (4) reporting an employer's criminal activity to a public 
authority. Id. at \ 9. However, the Court went on to say that the third category "poses 
analytical challenges different from, and generally greater than, the others," because it 
requires courts to add a cause of action to a statutory scheme when the Legislature could 
have done so but did not. Id. at <[ 10. The Court did not even grant status to the third 
category as being 'typical," but stated only that it is "eligible for consideration." Id. at 
952. The Court noted that these greater challenges exist even when the statutory right or 
privilege "carries strong public policy credentials." Id. at ^ 11. Moreover, when an 
aggrieved party asks a court to create a common law cause of action to help ensure that 
he or she enjoys the full exercise of their legislative rights or privileges, courts must 
necessarily engage in balancing both sides' competing policy interests: the employee's 
interest in maximizing enjoyment of workplace rights, and the employer's interest in 
regulating "the workplace environment to promote productivity, security, and similar 
lawful business objectives." Id. In such circumstances, "both employer and the 
employee may appeal to public policy in aid of their cause." Id. In keeping with its 
view that the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine "should be applied 
parsimoniously and on a case-by-case basis," the Court declined the opportunity to create 
a cause of action for employer interference with employee rights to keep and bear arms. 
Id. atT[14n.6. 
This Court's sensitivity to these concerns explains why in the overwhelming 
majority of the cases it has addressed, and, indeed, in all of its more recent decisions, it 
has found against the public policy wrongful discharge exception to the employment at-
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will rule and has continued to emphasize deference to the Legislature. To date, the only 
circumstances in which this Court has upheld application of the public policy wrongful 
discharge cause of action involved employees fired for refusing to commit crimes, 
Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992), or for opposing an employer's 
criminal activity, Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). In the thirteen 
years since Peterson and Heslop, the Court has not found in favor of this cause of action 
in any other circumstance. In a number of instances, it has rejected attempts to overcome 
the at-will rule based on the wrongful discharge theory. Although the Court's rationale 
has varied, it has consistently stressed the narrowness of this claim under Utah law. 
Wherever possible, the Court has deferred to the Legislature and has been loath to intrude 
on what it deems a legislative prerogative. 
Although not a wrongful discharge case, Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 
99 P.3d 842, demonstrates the Court's reluctance to create a cause of action based on a 
statute when the Legislature has not chosen to do so. In Buckner, a group of Salt Lake 
County employees sought to imply a private right of action for what they asserted was a 
violation of pay equity requirements under the County Personnel Management Act 
("CPMA"). In rejecting their claim, the Court emphasized its narrow approach: "In Utah, 
'[i]n the absence of language expressly granting a private right of action[J... the courts 
of this state are reluctant to imply a private right of action based on state law.'" Id. at 
f 40 (citations omitted). The Court further noted "Utah courts have rarely, if ever, found 
a Utah statute to grant an implied private right of action," and observed that the Utah 
Court of Appeals had come to the exact opposite conclusion as the Tenth Circuit Court of 
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Appeals in regard to an identical Utah statute, with the former holding that no right of 
action existed. Id. at Tf 43. The Court expressed an unwillingness to invade the province 
of the Legislature in order to create a new claim even if the claim furthered the statute's 
objectives: "The question before us is not simply whether employees may sue to enforce 
a pay equity requirement in the statutes, but whether the statutes authorize a remedy for 
noncompliance in the form of back pay for past periods of pay inequity." Id. at f^ 44. 
Moreover, "[t]he Legislature's silence cannot be interpreted as revealing an intent that 
employees have a right to seek back pay as a remedy for a claim to pay equity under the 
CPMA." Id. at f48. 
The implied private right of action analysis and the public policy wrongful 
discharge claim asserted in this lawsuit share an important similarity: Both rest on 
legislative enactments that Plaintiffs seek to use as a predicate for a personal cause of 
action even though the statute does not grant such right. Thus, the same rationale that led 
Buckner to refuse to create a new cause of action in the face of legislative silence should 
apply in this case where, in contrast to some of its fellow states, the Utah Legislature has 
continued to refrain from creating a cause of action based on retaliation for exercising 
WCA rights. Indeed, Buckner recognized the overlapping line between the implied 
private right and public policy wrongful discharge causes of action when it cited Utah 
precedent for the latter, and observed that there was no "clear and substantial" public 
policy involved in the plaintiffs' pay equity claims. It further observed that "there is no 
weighty rationale to overcome this court's normal reluctance to imply a cause of action 
from a statute. Even where there is a strong public policy, as in discrimination, the 
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legislative body retains the right to specify the remedies and course of action available for 
violations of a statute it has enacted to pursue such policy." Id at f 52. 
In the face of continuing of legislative silence, it would be anomalous for 
this Court to find the existence of a tort cause of action that permits Plaintiffs' sought-for 
relief such as compensatory and punitive damages, Complaint at ffif 268-69; as well as the 
advantage of a four-year statute of limitations. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25. Such rights 
and remedies would vastly exceed the ones the Legislature has chosen when it has acted 
to create causes of action for aggrieved employees. The anti-retaliation provision of the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act requires employees to assert their claims within 180 days, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107(l)(c), and limits relief to reinstatement, backpay and 
benefits, attorney fees and costs. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107(9). Employees are not 
entitled to a bench or jury trial but must pursue their claims administratively. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107. The anti-retaliation provision of Utah Occupational Safety and 
Health Act requires employees to bring their claims within 30 days before an 
administrative agency and limits relief to an injunction, reinstatement and back pay. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-6-203(2)(a). The anti-retaliation provision under the Utah 
Payment of Wages Act directs aggrieved employees to an administrative agency, UTAH 
CODE ANN. §34-28-19(2), and limits relief to an injunction, lost wages and benefits. 
UTAH CODE Am. §34-28-19(3). 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted the inappropriateness of courts using 
legislative silence to create more powerful causes of action than the Legislature has 
chosen when it has acted in comparable circumstances. In Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 
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95, 61 P.3d 989, the plaintiff asserted a wrongful discharge claim based on the public 
policy against sex discrimination. She attempted to use the common law claim to fill in 
the gap for employers with fewer than 15 employees, the UADA's statutory threshold. In 
rejecting this attempt, the Court said: "It would be illogical to suppose that the 
Legislature intended to provide the benefit of this timely and cost-effective procedure to 
large employers [referring to the UADA's administrative procedures] while, at the same 
time, intending to subject small employers to a civil tort action in which they would be 
vulnerable to a longer statute of limitations, damages, attorney fees and, possibly, a jury 
trial." Id. at If 13. In response to the argument that the Court's failing to recognize a 
cause of action would open the door for small employers to discriminate in violation of 
public policy, it responded that to do otherwise would be to "ignore the reality that it is 
the Legislature that primarily holds the power to open and shut that door. . . . Simply 
put, we must not craft a remedy when the Legislature intends no remedy to exist. . . . 
Those who desire to effectuate a change in Utah employment law should center their 
efforts on the legislative branch, whose purpose and duty it is to represent the voice of the 
people in determining the law of this state." Id. at f 23. 
4. Plaintiffs'Attempt To Rely On Landlord-Tenant Cases Is Not 
Persuasive. 
In the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Plaintiffs argued that a 
retaliatory eviction defense supports the creation of a retaliatory discharge claim. This 
argument illustrates the fallacy of the false analogy. In Building Monitoring Systems, Inc. 
v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1995), the Court did not create a retaliatory eviction 
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cause of action, or give tenants a claim for damages. It merely recognized retaliatory 
eviction as a defense to an unlawful detainer action when a tenant reports housing code 
violations to the authorities. The Court linked the defense to a specific statute that 
required the landlord to "maintain that unit in a condition fit for human habitation/5 UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 57-22-3(1). It did not treat the "general policies" in the housing code as a 
license to "create" a cause of action. In effect, it merely required the landlord to make 
the repairs and give the tenant a reasonable opportunity to relocate before an eviction 
could occur. Paxton, 905 P.2d at 1219; Brady v. Walter G. Slater, 2004 UT App 292. 
Thus, the Court did not "saddle the landlord with a perpetual tenant" or the burden of 
defending against a claim for damages that the Legislature itself did not create. Paxton, 
905P.2datl219. 
Recognizing a defense against an eviction from an apartment does not 
support the creation of a cause of action that would permit an at-will employee to sue his 
or her employer for uncapped tort damages. In Paxton, the Court tied the retaliatory 
eviction defense to specific statute designed to ensure that rental properties remain safe 
and sanitary for members of the public who might inhabit them. By contrast, an 
employer who discharges a particular employee for seeking workers' compensation 
benefits does not create an unsafe condition for the public or all employees. The matter 
is more like the private issues the Utah Supreme Court has said are not appropriate for 
carving out exceptions to the at-will rule based on the public policy wrongful discharge 
theory. See, e.g., Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, 987 P.2d 48; Rackley v. 
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Fairview Care Centers, Inc., 2001 UT 32, 23 P.3d 1022; Fox v. MCI Communications 
Corp., 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997). 
In the employment context, Utah courts have acknowledged the policy 
behind the at-will rule of employers being able to manage their workforces and the 
unique relationships between employers and employees, and the importance of balancing 
competing policy concerns when considering exceptions to the at-will doctrine. Hansen, 
2004 UT at f^ 9 ("Owing to the stability and predictability afforded employers and 
employees by that at-will rule, we have been justifiably wary of brushing broad public 
landscapes on the canvas of these cases, electing to limit the horizon of these cases by 
their facts"); Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P2d 151, 165 (Utah 1991) (there is a 
legitimate place "for broad employer discretion in terminating employment relationships, 
and there is also a legitimate correlative interest of employees in being able to quit for 
any or no reason at all"); see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 947, 982 (1984) ("the flexibility afforded by the contract at will permits 
the ceaseless marginal adjustments that are necessary in any ongoing productive activity 
conducted . . . in conditions of technological and business change"); Mayer G. Freed & 
Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 Emory 
L.J. 1097 (1989) (discussing the greater efficiency created by an at-will employment 
system, which serves both the worker and employer). There is no comparable policy for 
the landlord-tenant relationship. The creation of a temporary, limited defense to an 
unlawful detainer action based on a specific statute is simply not analogous to the 
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creation of a wrongful discharge tort based on the general policies in the workers' 
compensation law. 
B. EVEN IF THE COURT ANSWERS THE FIRST CERTIFIED 
QUESTION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
SHOULD NOT BE EXPANDED BEYOND AN ACTUAL 
DISCHARGE IN RETALIATION FOR EXERCISING RIGHTS 
UNDER THE WCA. 
As set forth by the Order of Certification, if this Court determines that a 
termination of an employee in retaliation for exercise of WCA rights implicates a clear 
and substantial public policy, it then needs to address whether the cause of action applies 
to one or more of the following: 
(a) An employee who is not injured but experiences retaliation for 
opposing an employer's treatment of other injured employees; 
(b) An employee who resigns under circumstances constituting 
"constructive discharge;" and 
(c) An employee who is neither fired nor constructively discharged but 
who experiences other discriminatory or harassing treatment in retaliation for exercising 
WCA rights. 
Defendant addresses each of these three categories separately below. At 
the outset, however, it observes that the reasons the Court should answer "no" to the first 
Certified Question given its conservative, judicious, and even "parsimonious" approach 
to expanding the wrongful discharge tort, discussed in Section A above, apply even more 
strongly in rejecting the ambitiously expansive applications presented by these three 
categories. 
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1. The Cause Of Action Should Not Be Extended To Non-Injured 
Employees Who Oppose The Treatment Of Injured Employees. 
The alleged "whistleblower" in this case is Plaintiff Marilyn Touchard. See 
Complaint ffl[ 45-66. Summarizing her allegations, Ms. Touchard states that as assistant 
safety manager, she disagreed with a number of La-Z-Boy's policies and practices 
regarding treatment of injured workers; her complaints to management went unheeded, 
however, and she was ultimately terminated "because she opposed its practices of 
abusing employees who applied for Workers Compensation benefits and maintained an 
unsafe work place." {Complaint ^  66). There are no allegations that she ever suffered an 
on-the-job injury, that she was otherwise entitled to Workers Compensation benefits or 
exercised any rights under the WCA, or even that she reported Defendant's alleged 
improper practices to an outside authority such as the Labor Commission of Utah that 
administers the WCA. 
Harkening back to the four categories eligible for consideration under 
Hansen v. America Online, supra, and discussed in Section A, there is nothing in the 
Complaint about Ms. Touchard allegedly refusing to commit an illegal act. She does not 
assert that her carrying out her responsibilities as assistant safety manager in making 
recommendations about Defendant's policies or practices constituted the performance of a 
"public obligation" like jury duty. She does not say she exercised a legal right or 
privilege and acknowledges that she herself had no Workers Compensation claim. 
Finally, the Complaint contains no suggestion that she reported to "a public authority" 
alleged "criminal activity." 2004 UT at \ 6. 
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Under Utah case law, a plaintiff must identify activity "in the public 
interest" that allegedly led to a retaliatory discharge. Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 
931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997) (noting further: "If an employee reports a criminal 
violation to an employer, rather than to public authorities, and is fired for making such 
reports, that does not, in our view, contravene a clear and substantial public policy 
[because the disclosure] serves the private interest of the employer, not the public 
interest."). Taken at face value, Ms. Touchard's alleged activity was not connected to a 
"public interest." She simply did her job in recommending to management policies or 
practices she believed needed to be adopted or needed to be dropped. See Ryan v. Dan's 
Food Stores, 972 P.2d at 408-09 ("only internal reporting that furthers a clear and 
substantial public policy will satisfy the third element of a wrongful discharge claim" -
Ryan's conduct in questioning prescriptions outside of what the law required him to 
question, and which did not involve reporting suspected criminal activity to the police, 
did not further public policy objectives. See also Johnson v. E.A. Miller, Inc., 1999 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 3002 ^ 12 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished): "To the extent that [plaintiffs'] 
claims are based upon retaliation for internal company complaints (not communicated to 
public authorities), they do not implicate a clear and substantial public policy." 
Several jurisdictions that have recognized the basic wrongful discharge tort 
for Workers Compensation retaliation, such as Indiana, have resisted extending the 
"public interest" rationale to employees who themselves were not injured. In Wior v.. 
Anchor Industries, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. 1996), the court refused to extend the tort 
to an employee who alleged he was fired for refusing to fire an injured worker who had 
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filed a workers compensation claim. Since the plaintiff could not point to any particular 
"statutory right or duty," the court was unwilling to stretch the public interest rationale of 
preserving workers compensation benefits for injured workers to someone who was not 
entitled to those benefits: "Generally, we are disinclined to adopt generalized exceptions 
to the employment-at-will doctrine in the absence of clear statutory expression of a right 
or duty that is contravened." Id. at 178, n.5. 
2. The Cause of Action Should Not Be Extended to Claims of 
Constructive Discharge. 
In the Complaint, Plaintiff Frank Ross alleges he was "forced to resign" 
and experienced a "constructive discharge." {Complaint fflf 238-239). However, 
expanding the theory to this type of claim would constitute a further inroad on 
employment-at-will without legislative support or direction. Although the Utah Court of 
Appeals applied the doctrine of constructive discharge in Sheikh v. Department of Public 
Safety, 904 P.2d 1103 (Ut. App. 1995), it did so in construing an express statutory cause 
of action which itself was not limited to discharge but applied to various other forms of 
activity listed under UTAH CODE ANN, § 34-35-6, including hiring, promotion, demotion, 
retaliation, harassment, or discrimination "in matters of compensation or in terms, 
privileges, and conditions of employment" 
When the issue is whether to add a new limitation to employment-at-will in 
the absence of legislative action, even some courts that have applied it to actual discharge 
have drawn the line there and rejected constructive discharge. See, e.g., Hinthorn v. 
Roland's of Bloomington, Inc., 119 I11.2d 526, 530-31, 519 N.E.2d 909 (1988): "We 
4090/2 00068588 v 2 33 
agree that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she was discharged, but wish to make 
abundantly clear that we are not now endorsing the constructive discharge concept 
rejected by the appellate court in [Scheller v. Health Care Service Corp., 138 111. App.3d 
19, 485 N.E.2d 26 (1985)]." Illinois courts have repeatedly emphasized that the Workers1 
Compensation retaliation exception to at-will employment is exceedingly narrow and that 
courts should not expand it without legislative direction. 
3. The Cause of Action Should Not Be Extended to Other Alleged 
Forms of Discrimination or Harassment 
Although it is not clear from the Complaint what Plaintiffs allege regarding 
discriminatory treatment or harassment other than being fired or constructively 
discharged, the Order of Certification seeks guidance from this Court on this issue. The 
reasons given above for resisting Plaintiffs' desire to stretch the wrongful discharge tort 
into myriad new shapes and forms apply especially strongly here. None of the many 
Utah cases addressing the wrongful discharge theory have ever strayed beyond discharge 
and there is no indication in any of these various opinions of the Court's inclination to do 
so. 
Even courts that have gone beyond Utah in applying the public policy 
theory to Workers' Compensation have rejected such expansionist urgings. See 
Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 IU.2d 29, 645 N.E.2d 877, 880-82 (1994), in 
which the court rejected plaintiffs request: 
to extend the existing law to circumstances in which an employee suffers a 
loss of employment status or income or both, but is not terminated from her 
employment altogether.... In our view, adoption of plaintiff s argument 
would replace the well developed element of discharge with a new, 
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ill-defined and potentially all-encompassing concept of retaliatory conduct 
or discrimination. The courts would then be called upon to become 
increasingly involved in the resolution of workplace disputes which center 
on employer conduct that heretofore has not been actionable at common 
law or by statute. Id. at 38-39. 
See also: Below v. Skarr, 569 N.W.2d 510, 512, 1997 la. Supp. LEXIS 276 (1997), in 
which the court refused to recognize a cause of action based on threats and harassment 
short of discharge since by doing so, the court "would encourage a rash of common-law 
claims by any potential workers' compensation recipients who claim to have been 
threatened with termination or subjected to any other form of harassment in the work 
place by simply asserting that it was retaliatory in nature." In Mintz v. Bell Atlantic 
Systems Leasing International 183 Ariz. 550, 553, 905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ct. App. 1995), 
the court held that "the tort of wrongful failure-to-promote does not exist:" 
Recognizing a retaliation tort for actions short of termination could subject 
employers to torrents of unwanted and vexatious suits filed by disgruntled 
employees at every juncture in the employment process. And why stop at 
demotions? If, as Ludwig argues, a demotion raises the same policy 
concerns as a termination, so too would transfers, alterations in job duties, 
and perhaps even disciplinary proceedings. The potential for expansion of 
this type of litigation is enormous. Id. quoting, Ludwig v. C&A 
Wallcoverings, Inc., 960 F2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1992). 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Court should not extend the public policy exception to the at-will 
doctrine to a situation in which an employee has filed a workers' compensation claim, 
because (1) the Legislature created the right to benefits and has seen fit not to enact any 
anti-retaliation statute; (2) there is no specific statement of a "clear and substantial" 
public policy in the workers' compensation statute to protect claimants from retaliation; 
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(3) if an employee sustains an injury, the statutory entitlement to workers' compensation 
benefits remains in effect regardless of whether the employment ends; and (4) the vast 
majority of jurisdictions that have recognized a workers' compensation retaliation claim 
have relied on their legislatures, not their courts, to enact an anti-retaliation statute before 
recognizing such cause of action. Furthermore, if the Court nevertheless chooses to 
judicially create a retaliatory discharge cause of action despite legislative silence, it 
should restrict the cause of action solely to employees who are fired in retaliation for 
seeking workers' compensation benefits in order to avoid further incursion on the 
legislative function. 
DATED: December 12, 2005. 
BULLARD SMITH JERNSTEDT WILSON 
Jathan Janove, USB No. 3722 ' 
Attorneys for Appellant 
La-Z-Boy Incorporated 
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U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MARILYN TOUCHARD, THOMAS 
AMMONS, FELIX BARELA, OSCAR 
GARCIA, DENNIS NELSON, WADE 
PETERSON, FRANK ROSS and HEIDI 
SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LA-Z-BOY INCORPORATED, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 1-04-CV-67 
ORDER OF CERTIFICATION 
Judge Tena Campbell 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, based upon the stipulation of the 
parties and the Court's concurrence, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure governing the certification of questions of law by United States courts, hereby submits 
to the Utah Supreme Court the following certified questions of law, which are determinative of 
certain of plaintiffs' claims in the above-captioned matter now pending before this court, but 
which do not appear to be clearly answered under Utah statutory law and controlling precedent: 
Whether the exercise of rights under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §34A-2-101, et. seo... ("UWCA") implicates "a clear and substantial public policy" 
of the State of Utah that would provide a basis for a claim of wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy; and if so, 
Whether this cause of action applies in the following circumstances: (a) where the 
employee has not filed for benefits under the UWCA but is retaliated against for 
opposing an employees treatment of other injured employees who are entitled to file for 
benefits under the UWCA; (b) the employee is not fired but resigns under circumstances 
that constitute a "constructive discharge'5; and (c) the employee who has filed for benefits 
under the UWCA is neither fired nor constructively discharged, but experiences other 
discriminatory treatment or harassment from an employer because the employee has 
exercised rights under the UWCA. 
Background 
Eight former employees of defendant have brought an action against it based on how it 
allegedly treats employees who suffer on-the-job injuries. Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts three 
causes of action under Utah common law.1 The cause of action relevant to this Order is 
plaintiffs' claim for wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception to the at-will rule of 
employment. 
With respect to plaintiffs' cause of action, defendant asserts that it should be dismissed 
because the Utah Supreme Court would not recognize a cause of action for wrongful termination 
for an employee discharged in retaliation for seeking benefits under the UWCA. Defendant 
further asserts that even if such a claim were recognized, it would not be extended to claims of 
constructive discharge, to a non-injured employee who claims retaliation for opposing treatment 
of other injured workers (as alleged by plaintiff Touchard). This court has reserved ruling on 
this portion of defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pending the Utah Supreme 
Court's response to this Order of Certification. 
1
 The matter was originally filed in the First Judicial District Court of Box Elder County, State of Utah, on April 12, 
2004. It was subsequently removed to this court based on diversity of citizenship. 
2 
Discussion 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized four categories of discharge "eligible for 
consideration" under the public policy exception to the employment at-will rule: (1) refusing to 
commit an illegal act, (2) performing a public duty, (3) exercising a legal right; or (4) reporting 
an employee's criminal activity to a public authority. Hansen v. American Online. Inc.. 96 P.3d 
950,952 (Utah 2004). Although the Court has referred to discharge for seeking workers' 
compensation benefits as an example of the third category, it has never directly ruled on the 
question. 
Plaintiffs contend that the Utah Supreme Court would apply the cause of action to their 
claims. They note that the Court has twice used discharge for filing workers5 compensation 
claims as an example of the third category of the public policy wrongful discharge cause of 
action, Hansen v. American Online. Inc., 96 P.3d 950,952 (Utah), and Ryan v. Dan's Food 
Stores. Inc.. 972 P.2d 395,408 (Utah 1998). Plaintiffs point to developments around the country 
and assert that most courts that have addressed the issue have recognized the cause of action in 
these circumstances. Plaintiffs contend that extending their claims to include protection for 
constructive discharge and internal opposition claims are consistent with the public policy 
rationale creating the exception to employment at-will and that Utah courts have previously 
adopted the doctrine of constructive discharge, e.g.. Sheikh v. Department of Public Safety. 904 
P.2d 1103 (Utah App. 1995). 
Defendant argues that the Court's decisions evince a strong reluctance to create or extend 
causes of action to terminated employees in the absence of legislative direction. It points to the 
Court's language in Hansen that exceptions to employment at-will "should be applied 
3 
parsimoniously" and that the third category "poses analytical challenges different from, and 
generally greater than the others" even when the statutory right or privilege "carries strong public 
policy credentials." Id. at 952-953. Defendant also points to other recent decisions, including 
Bucknerv.Kennard> 99 P3d 842 (Utah 2004), and Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 61 P.3d 989 (Utah 
2002), as showing the Court's reluctance to add causes of action to legislative schemes when the 
Utah Legislature could have done so but did not. Defendant further argues that even if the public 
policy wrongful discharge claim is applied to terminations for seeking UWCA benefits, it should 
not be extended to claims of constructive discharge, other forms of retaliation or internal 
opposition to an employer's workers' compensation practices, noting jurisdictions such as 
Illinois that have refused to expand the common law exception beyond retaliatory discharge, see, 
e.g., Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E. 2d 877 (01.1995). 
Conclusion 
This court concludes that the question outlined herein is unsettled under existing Utah 
law. Accordingly, the clerk of this court shall submit to the Utah Supreme Court a certified copy 
of this Certification, together with the briefs filed in this court and any portion of the record 
before this court that may be required by the Utah Supreme Court. Pursuant to Rule 41 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this court orders that the fees and costs of this Certification 
shall be apportioned equally between the parties. 
DATED this / / . day of April, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
ph E. Chamness 
5 
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EXHIBIT B 
IN 36 STATES, COURTS DID NOT CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE 
ABSENCE OF AN ANTI-RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE STATUTE 
1. IN 5 STATES, COURTS EXPRESSLY REFUSED TO CREATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THE LEGISLATURE HAS CONTINUED 
NOT TO ENACT AN ANTI-RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE 
STATUTE 
Delaware Emory v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc., 1985 Del. Super. LEXIS 1063 (Del. 
1985) ("In Delaware, it is for the General Assembly, not the judiciary, to 
declare the public policy of the state"). 
Georgia Evans v. Bibb Company, 178 Ga. App. 139; 342 S.E.2d 484 (1986) 
("Courts may interpret laws, but may not change them"). 
Mississippi J.C Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Company, 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 
1981) ("[t]he merits of his arguments are clearly for the Legislature to 
assess, not the judiciary. Our Workmen's Compensation Law does not 
contain a provision making it a crime for an employer to discharge an 
employee for filing a claim"). 
Rhode Pacheco v. Raytheon Company, 623 A.2d 464 (ELL 1993) ("It is not the 
Island role of the courts to create rights for persons whom the Legislature has not 
chosen to protect"). 
Wisconsin Brown v. Pick'N Save Food Stores, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (Wis. 2001) 
("[T]he Wisconsin legislature created forfeiture as the only remedy in this 
situation, and in 1975 it created a cause of action for a related kind of 
discrimination but not for this kind of discrimination"). 
2. IN 6 STATES, COURTS EXPRESSLY REFUSED TO CREATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION, BUT THE LEGISLATURE HAS SINCE 
CREATED A CAUSE OF ACTION BY ENACTING AN ANTI-
RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE STATUTE 
Alabama Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814, 815 (Ala. 1984) 
("Why then should we not leave it to the legislature to change the rule in 
this case, where the employee was discharged allegedly for seeking 
workmen's compensation benefits, a legislatively created right?"), 
superseded by statute, ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (prohibiting termination, 
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as recognized in Twilley v. Dauber & Coated Prods., Inc., 536 So. 2d 
1364 (Ala. 1988). 
Florida Segal v. Arrow Industries Corporation, 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1978) 
("There is no statute for retaliatory discharge. The court declines to 
follow the reasoning of cases such as Frarnpton, superseded by FLA. 
STAT. § 440.205 (prohibiting discharge, threatening discharge, 
intimidation or coercion). 
Missouri Christy v. Paul Petrus, d/b/a South Side Auto Parts, 365 Mo. 1187; 295 
S.W.2d 122 (1956) ("We can hardly conceive of the legislature making 
such careful provision for the rights and compensation of injured 
employees covered by the Act and yet omitting a specific provision for 
recovery of damages for wrongful discharge if there had been any intent 
to create such a right'') superseded by statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.780 
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination in any way) as recognized in 
Kratzer v. Polar Custom Trailers, Inc., et al, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16981 (Mo. 2003). 
New York N. Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 120 (prohibiting discharge or 
discrimination in any manner), as recognized in (Axel v. Dujfy-Mott 
Company, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 1; 389 N.E.2d 1075 (1979) ("This relatively 
recently enacted statute forbids employers to discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against employees who claim compensation for job-related 
injuries or who testify in proceedings to enforce such payment55); cf. 
Murphy v. American Home Products Corporation, 58 N.Y.2d 293; 448 
N.E.2d 86 (1983) ("This court has not and does not now recognize a 
cause of action in tort for abusive or wrongful discharge of an 
employee; such recognition must await action of the Legislature"). 
North Carolina Dockery v. Lampart Table Company and U.S. Furniture Industries, 36 
N.C. App. 293; 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978) ("If the General Assembly of 
North Carolina had intended a cause of action be created, surely, in a 
workmen's compensation statute as comprehensive as ours, it would 
have specifically addressed the problem."), superseded by statute, N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 95-241 (prohibiting discrimination or retaliatory action), as 
recognized in Abels v. Renfro Corporation, 335 N.C. 209; 436 S.E.2d 
822(1993). 
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South Carolina Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536; 59 S.E.2d 148 
(1950) (dismissing complaint because a retaliatory discharge for filing a 
worker's compensation claim fails to state a claim), superseded by 
statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-80, as recognized in Hinton v. Designer 
Ensembles, Inc., 343 S.C. 236; 540 S.E.2d 94 (2000) (prohibiting 
discharge or demotion). 
3. IN 25 STATES, LEGISLATURES FILLED SILENCE BY 
ENACTING ANTI-RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE 
STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL RULE 
Alaska Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc., 93 P.3d 427 (Alas. 2004) (allowing a 
cause of action based on ALASKA STAT. § 23.30-247, which prohibits 
discrimination in hiring, "promotion, or retention policies or practices"). 
California Portillo v. G. T. Price Productions, Inc., et al, 131 Cal. App. 3d 285; 
182 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1982) (allowing a cause of action based on CAL. 
LABOR CODE§ 132a, which prohibits discharge, threatening to discharge 
or discrimination in any manner). 
Connecticut Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division, United Technologies 
Corporation, 814 F.2d 102 (1987) (allowing a cause of action based on 
CONN. GEN STAT. § 31-290a, which prohibits discharge or 
discriminating in any manner). 
Hawaii Takaki v. Allied Machinery Corporation, et al, 87 Haw. 57; 951 P.2d 
507 (1998) (allowing a cause of action based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-
32 which prohibits discharge and discrimination based "solely" the 
employee suffering a work injury). 
Indiana Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company, 260 Ind. 249; 297 N.E.2d 
425 (1973) ("We believe the threat of discharge to be a 'device' within 
the framework of 22-3-2-15") (allowing a cause of action based on IND. 
CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15, which provides that "No contract or agreement, 
written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device shall, in any 
manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any 
obligation created by this act"). 
Iowa Springer v. Weeks and Leo Company, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558 (1988) 
(allowing a cause of action based on low A CODE § 85.18, which 
provides that "No contract, rule, or device whatsoever shall operate to 
relieve the employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created by 
this chapter except as herein provided"). 
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Kentucky Overnite Transportation Company v. Michael A. Gaddis, et al, 793 
S.W.2d 129 (1990) (allowing a cause of action based on KY. REV STAT. 
ANN. § 342.197, which prohibits discharge, refusal to hire, harassment, 
coercion or discrimination in any manner). 
Louisiana Robin v. Raoul "Skip" Galan, Clerk of the Court of Jefferson Parish, 
545 So. 2d 1129 (La. 1989) (allowing a cause of action based on LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1361, which prohibits discharge and refusal to 
hire). 
Maine ME. REV STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A § 353 (prohibits discrimination in any 
manner). 
Maryland Ewing v. Koppers Company, Inc., 312 Md. 45; 537 A.2d 1173 (1988) 
(allowing a cause of action based on MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 
9-1105, which prohibits discharge based "solely" on employee filing a 
claim). 
Massachusetts Ourfalian v. Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 294; 
577 N.E.2d 6 (1991) (allowing a cause of action based on MASS. ANN. 
LAWS. CH. 152 § 75B, which prohibits discharge, discrimination in any 
manner or refusal to hire). 
Minnesota Wojciak v. Northern Package Corporation, 310 N.W.2d 675 (1981) 
(allowing a cause of action based on MINN. STAT. § 176.82, which 
prohibits discharge or threatening to discharge). 
Montana Lueck v. United Parcel Service, 258 Mont. 2; 851 P.2d 1041 (1993) 
(allowing a cause of action based on MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-317, 
which prohibits termination). 
New Jersey Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668; 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (allowing a 
cause of action based on N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-39.1, which prohibits 
retaliation). 
Ohio Wilson v. Riverside Hospital, 18 Ohio St. 3d 8; 479 N.E.2d 275 (1985) 
(allowing a cause of action based on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90, 
which prohibits discharge, demotion, reassignment or any punitive 
action). 
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Oklahoma Bishop v. Hale-Halsell Company, Inc., 1990 OK 95; 800 P.2d 232 
(1990) (allowing a cause of action based on OKLA. STAT. tit. 85 § 5, 
which prohibits discharge). 
Oregon 
South Dakota 
Brown v. Transcon Lines et al, 284 Ore. 597; 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) 
(allowing a cause of action based on OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.043, which 
prohibits discharge, discrimination or refusal to hire). 
Niesent v. Homestake Mining Company of California, 505 N.W.2d 781 
(S.D. 1993) (allowing a cause of action based on S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 
62-3-18, which provides that "No contract or agreement, express or 
implied, no rule, regulation, or other device, shall in any manner operate 
to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by 
this title except as herein provided"). 
Tennessee Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Company, 677 S.W.2d 441 (1984) ("In this 
regard, we agree with Frampton that a retaliatory discharge constitutes a 
device under § 50-6-114) (allowing a cause of action based on TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 50-6-114, which provides that "No contract or agreement, 
written or implied or rule, regulation or other device, shall in any 
manner operate to relieve any employer, in whole or in part, of any 
obligation"). 
Texas Texas Steel Company v. Edward Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (1976) 
(allowing a cause of action based on TEX. LAB. CODE § 451.001, which 
prohibits discharge or discrimination in any manner). 
Vermont Murray v. St. Michael's College and Donald Sutton, 164 Vt. 205; 667 
A.2d 294 (1995) (allowing a cause of action based on VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21 § 710, which prohibits discharge or discrimination). 
Virginia Cooley v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 257 Va. 518; 514 S.E.2d 770 (1999) 
(allowing a cause of action based on VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-308, which 
prohibits discharge). 
Washington Lins v. Children's Discovery Centers of American, Inc., 95 Wn. App. 
486; 972 P.2d 168 (1999) (allowing a cause of action based on WASH. 
REV. CODE § 51.48.025, which prohibits discharge or discrimination in 
any manner). 
West Virginia Skaggs v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 212 W. VA. 248; 569 S.E.2d 
769 (2002) (allowing a cause of action based on W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-
5A-1, which prohibits discrimination in any manner). 
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Wyoming Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware, 776 P.2d 
752 (Wyo. 1989) (allowing a cause of action based on WYO. STAT ANN 
§ 27-14-104(b), which provides that "No contract, rule, regulation or 
device shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability created by 
this act except as otherwise provided by this act"). 
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EXHIBIT C 
IN 11 STATES, COURTS CREATED A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE 
GENERAL POLICIES IN THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION STATUTE, 
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC ANTI-RETALIATION OR 
INTERFERENCE STATUTE 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501 (prohibits retaliatory termination and provides 
the right to bring a tort claim for wrongful termination). Although the 
Arizona Supreme Court indicated in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial 
Hospital et al,147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (that an at-will 
employee could bring a wrongful termination in violation of public policy 
and that the court itself could determine the public policy from common 
law, the Arizona legislature rebuked the court for usurping its function. 
Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290; 69 P.3d 1011 (2003) 
("The legislature in enacting A.R.S. § 23-1501 took express exception to 
the court's indication that it rather than the legislature had the authority to 
define public policy"). 
Arkansas Wal-Mart v. Pam Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239; 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991) 
(creating a cause of action based on criminal statute), superseded by ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (prohibits discrimination in regard to hiring or 
employment and provides penalties as determined by the Workers' 
Compensation Commission; specifically annulling Wal-Mart) as 
recognized by Tackett v. Crain Automotive d/b/a Car Pro, 321 Ark. 36; 
899 S.W.2d 839 (1995) ("There is no doubt that the legislature's intent in 
the passage of Act 796 of 1993 [amending Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107] in 
fact its avowed purpose was to overrule our decisions [in three cases, 
including Wal-Mart], where we" created retaliatory discharge tort based 
on the criminal statute) (J. Corbin dissenting opinion). 
Colorado Lathrop v. Entenmann's Inc., 770 P.2d 1367; 1989 Colo. App. LEXIS 26 
(1989). 
Illinois Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 1A 111. 2d; 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (creating a 
wrongful discharge tort based on "beneficent purpose" of the workers' 
compensation law). 
Kansas Murphy v. City ofTopeka-Shawnee County Department of Labor 
Services etal, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488; 630 P.2d 186 (1981). 
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Michigan Svento v. The Kroger Company, 69 Mich. App. 644; 245 N.W.2d 151 
(1976) (retaliatory discharge contravenes public policy) This state now 
has a statute to enforce retaliatory discharge MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301 
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination in any manner). 
Nebraska Jackson v. Morris Communications Corporation, 265 Neb. 423; 657 
N.W.2d 634 (2003). 
Nevada 
New Mexico 
North 
Dakota 
Hansen v. Harrah 's, 100 Nev. 60; 675 P.2d 394 (1984). 
Michaels v. Anglo America Auto Auctions, Inc., 117 N.M. 91; 869 P.2d 
279 (1994) (enforcing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28.2) (prohibiting 
discharge, threatening to discharge or retaliating). 
Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home and Rodney Auer, 415 N.W.2d 
793 (1987) (allowing a cause of action based on N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-
01-01, which provides a cause of action based on language in the 
workers' compensation act providing for "sure and certain relief). 
Pennsylvania Shick v. Donald L. Shirey T/D/B/A Donald L. Shirey Lumber, 465 Pa. 
Super. 667; 691 A.2d 511 (1997). 
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EXHIBIT D 
IN 3 STATES, COURTS HAVE NOT DETERMINED WHETHER A CAUSE OF 
ACTION EXISTS AND THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT ENACT AN ANTI-
RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE STATUTE 
Idaho 
New Hampshire 
Utah 
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